This scheme is designed to bring the best science into the policy making process around impacts of climate change through market means based on the standard mechanisms of insurance. It builds on a previously posted scheme to create incentives for reduction in CO2 emissions while minimizing the harm to domestic production and employment. As was the case with the earlier scheme, this is presented not in the expectation that its virtues alone will lead to its adoption, but to elicit responses from economists, policy makers, and others in order either to improve the proposal as is or to expose ways that the actual world departs from the ideals of the market. Read the rest of this entry »
If any doubts arise about receipt of an email, use RR (receipt acknowledgement requested) if you are sender. Confirm if you are receiver so sender knows they’ve got through.
If you need to delay responding to an email, acknowledge receipt of it and indicate that there will be a delay in responding. (Otherwise, the sender might worry that you are sitting on the issue and, passive-aggressively, making them nudge you again.)
Establish a system to keep track of emails to be answered and don’t let difficult-to-answer emails stay at the bottom of the yet-to-be answered pile.
Download and read emails carefully–don’t respond quickly just because you’re online.
Don’t add complexity by interpreting other people’s motives or behavior when the relevant information or the outcome you seek can be stated directly.
Don’t send a message with emotional impact until you’ve slept on it.
Don’t send a message when it’s a way to avoid talking or if it would be better to talk.
If an issue is sensitive for you, don’t plead your case by email; use email only for information and putting succinct memos formally on the record.
If someone emails requesting to talk, don’t try to process things further by email.
There are many reasons why faculty partners have difficulty finding employment in the same area. One major obstacle, which this plan addresses, occurs when institutions, or departments within an institution, feel that partner hiring would require them to appoint to their line someone whom they wouldn’t have chosen in open competition. Another obstacle is the resentment that builds when partner hiring happens inconsistently, e.g., if only when the candidate or faculty member has clout, and through negotiations only before taking up an appointment. The plan and mechanism to follow depends not on ad hoc decisions, but on a pool of lines created as a “tax” on all, with the degree of tax adjusted according to perceived needs. Read the rest of this entry »